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Amy Gajda’s The Trials of Academe ought to be required reading for any
attorney considering or embarking upon a career as a college or university
counsel. Indeed, those currently serving in such a position should find Gajda’s
chronicle of the events leading to today’s era of campus litigation absorbing
as well as graphic proof that they are not the only campus counsel facing a
growing and increasingly diversified docket of legal disputes.
Gajda, an associate professor at Tulane Law School, persuasively
distinguishes between the presence of colleges and universities in the courts
before the 1960s and since, arguing that passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and its progeny during the following decade opened the way for the
dramatic increase in litigation over the rights of university students, faculty,
and administrators since then.
Commencing in the 1960s, courts have largely set aside, not always through
gradual evolution, their traditional doctrines of “academic abstention” and “in
loco parentis,” doctrines that gave broad and unfettered authority to universities
to operate largely without judicial interference. This notable change in judicial
perspective in large part followed the passage of civil rights litigation in the
1960s and early 1970s. That legislation for the first time delineated explicit
statutory rights for individuals and groups who were discriminated against
by public or private entities or by individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, gender, or other enumerated characteristics.
Gajda reminds the reader on several occasions of Justice Frankfurter’s
articulation in Sweezy v. New Hampshire1 of the four essential elements of academic
freedom: “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
While recognizing the dramatic increase in judicial involvement in disputes
arising in the university context, and while recognizing some of the benefits
that have accrued to all of the relevant parties as a consequence of that increase,
Gajda retreats time and again to a nostalgic perspective, one that laments
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how “the growing resort to legal process…threatens to undermine values of
academic freedom that have served American society extremely well” (9–10),
and how essential it is to “search for ways to…minimize the risks of judicial
involvement” (19).
Gajda effectively and absorbingly proceeds through her comprehensive
history of academe and the courts, focusing on the recurring subjects of
litigation, including anti-discrimination law, First Amendment balancing,
intellectual property ownership, and faculty/administration tensions. In so
doing, she seems to evolve in her own views toward a recognition that the
benefits arising from the dramatic increase in the incidence of litigation must
be balanced against the detriments attributable to judicial encroachment
upon the values embedded in notions of academic freedom. She states that
“[t]he challenge…is to import legal doctrines in a way that is sensitive to
the academic context and cognizant of its potential costs” (131). Even more
forcefully, Gajda notes that “[t]he challenge is to shun the alternative extremes
of wholesale immunity and unbridled oversight and to define terms for court
intervention that balance interests in nondiscrimination against legitimate
interests in academic freedom and autonomy (80)…. [W]e are realistically
left with the unavoidable task of setting a balance point between the value of
accountability through the courts and the value of limiting intrusions on the
autonomy of academic communities”(248).
When Gajda’s theses are dissected with vigor, one may be inexorably
drawn to two fundamental conclusions: first, that she demonstrates a degree
of concern for academic freedom that appears to downplay the positive
influences in the academic environment that have been notable in the reported
case law over the last fifty years; and second, that she directs her entreaties
to the courts alone for appropriate recognition of the benefits of “academic
abstention” and the need to recognize the valuable role that academic freedom
plays in American society.
The world of academe before the tumultuous decade that roughly began with
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be characterized, with considerable
and persuasive evidentiary support, as a bastion of white male supremacy.
With the introduction and growth of legislation and resulting case law that was
directed at breaking down barriers that thwarted the legitimate aspirations of
those who theretofore were unwelcome, academic life has admittedly become
more complex and litigious but also more open and equitable. What Gajda
views throughout her work as a threat to academic freedom and the academic
mission can also be viewed as an effort to assure fairness and compliance with
legal norms that govern all other facets of society’s activities and relationships.
Put yet another way, have not the efforts of some to preserve academic freedom
and autonomy come at too great a cost? Is “academic freedom” often nothing
more than a rubric for preserving the white male dominance of the historical
academy? In short, have not the rights vested in racial and ethnic minorities
and in women, by way of example, brought benefits to academia and the larger
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society that far outweigh whatever disadvantages may be identified as a result
of judicial intrusion into the unique aspects of academic life and relationships?
Embracing judicial expansion of the rights of all members of the academic
community does not suggest that courts should disregard the values embedded
in academic abstention and academic freedom, but by recognizing such values
courts should not judge colleges and universities differently with respect to
civil rights from other institutions, public and private. When a member of
the academic community, for example, asserts unlawful discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and tenure; encroachment on his or her First Amendment
or privacy rights; misappropriation of his or her intellectual property; or an
administrative process that ignores material provisions of the Faculty Code
of Conduct, Student Code of Conduct, or staff personnel policies, historical
judicial notions of academic abstention and academic freedom need not and
should not prevail. Yes, academic life may become less collegial with the
increasing incidence of campus-related litigation, and yes, life for campus
senior administrators and their counsel may become more complex and
law-driven, but this arguably is a small price to pay to enable those who feel
aggrieved to pursue their claims within the processes prescribed by relevant
campus policies and regulations and, if deemed necessary, thereafter through
the courts. In the last two decades or more, campus counsel have become
accustomed to confronting such disputes, to helping the parties frame
the legal issues, to helping to resolve disputes before they escalate, and to
providing advice and counsel to senior administrators that often leads to a
softening of once-intractable positions and early resolution. Even in the most
contentious of contexts, university lawyers have assisted judicial and external
administrative proceedings to the end that the courts are more likely to reach
a just conclusion regarding the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Gajda makes a persuasive case that universities should do a better job
of educating the judicial decision maker about what is and is not unique
about the academic environment. She states that “[t]he biggest priority for
universities, today and going forward, must be to work to educate courts
about the importance and social value of higher education to society, and the
importance of academic freedom and institutional autonomy to the success
of higher education” (252). No one can legitimately argue with Gajda’s
proposition, provided the education effort does not downplay the admirable
improvements in the openness and equality on campuses that have been
achieved over the last five-plus decades. At the same time, Gajda’s laudable
proposition is too narrowly framed. Despite zealous efforts to educate the
courts about the uniqueness of American institutions of higher education,
individual judges and justices have and will continue to harbor different views
about the extent to which courts should defer to academic judgments and
behaviors. As Gajda points out, some, such as Justice Stephen Breyer in Wynne
v. Tufts University School of Medicine2 (a case in which the court refused to second
guess the medical school’s decision to dismiss a failing student who claimed he
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needed relief from multiple-choice exams due to his dyslexia), will defer to the
subjective judgment and experience of the professoriate, an attitude perhaps
attributable in Justice Breyer’s case to his having spent more than a quarter of
a century as a member of the faculty of the Harvard Law School. Yet others,
such as Justice Clarence Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger3 (the case addressing the
permissibility of employing affirmative action in the context of admissions
to the University of Michigan Law School) mock the alleged superiority of
higher education decision making and find no rationale for treating colleges
and universities differently in the courtroom from any other institution.
With these judicial realities in mind, one might constructively advance
Gajda’s thesis by expanding its intended audience to include legislators and
the public they serve. In today’s increasingly polarized and strident political
environment, it is not so much the courts that need to understand the critical
roles played by today’s university, but rather those who choose their elected
representatives and the representatives who, once elected, develop and put
into effect the laws, policies, and budgets that dramatically impact higher
education. When state legislatures and governors make budgetary decisions,
particularly in today’s fiscally trying times, they must be aware of the costs,
present and future, associated with dramatic reductions in higher education
funding. Similarly, they must be provided with the relevant data and
arguments to surmount the temptation to succumb to the entreaties of vocal
but misguided constituents to hold budgetary allocations hostage to efforts
to encroach upon the university’s right to decide without outside interference
who teaches, what is taught, how it is taught, and to whom.
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